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INCIDENTAL INJURIES.
VI. IVCiDENVTAL IIVJURIES FROM1f THE EXERCISE
OF LA W.VUL RIGHTS.
A tort consists in some act or omission by one party
whereby the lawful rights of another are invaded, obstructed
or abridged. The elements of a tort are a wrong and a result-
ing damage; there is no tort where there is no wrong, and
there is also no tort where there is no damage. The wrong,
however, need not be one of intent, for the most innocent
invasion of one's rights is a tort, as well as the most malicious;
the malice being in many cases only an aggravation. Neither
is it essential that the damage should always be tangible and
susceptible of proof, for if a legal right is trampled upon, the
law will imply damage, and the implication is conclusive.
In the present paper those cases will be considered in
which one person suffers an injury in consequence of the ex-
ercise by another person of his legal rights. Many such
cases occur in which, although the injury may be severe, the
law will award no compensation, there being no tort in the
case because there is an absence of that wrong the concur-
rence of which with damage is essential to an action. Neg-
ligence might supply the wrong, but we now speak of cases
of which that is not an element.
It is almost impossible to conceive of a lawful action that
may not by possibility cause injury to another. One man es-
tablishes a store which takes away from the profits of a store
already established; he erects a mill, in consequence of which
the value of another in the vicinity is sensibly diminished ;1
he collects his debt, and the debtor's business is broken up
to the prejudice of others who were customers; he assists in
starting a new town, which draws away the business from an
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307, 313; Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns.
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older one; or he gives to the public a park on one side of a,
city, which changes relative values to the prejudice of the
opposite side ;-in all these cases the injury may be very
perceptible and easily traced to the cause which has pro-
duced it, but there is manifestly no ground for the sugges-
tion that an action at law should redress it.
Some other cases which must be decided on the same:
ground do not at first view seem so clear. The case of a.
house commanding a fine view, which is cut off and destroyed.
by the erection of a building on the adjacent premises, may
be taken as an illustration. The injury here is very direct
and special, and it seems to take something from the man's
property, and to deprive him In a measure of its enjoyment..
But on the other hand, if every man might protect his view
against the improvements of his neighbors, it is manifest that
it would give him such a control of adjacent property as
would preclude improvements, except with his consent; and
to protect his view would usually diminish the value of the
neighbor's property more than it would enhance his own. It
was determined at an early day that an erection by one on
his own premises which obstructed the view of another was
not a legal wrong;2 and the principle is held to cover the
case of a structure on the party's own land which injures the
value of business property in the rear of it by cutting off the
view from the street.3 The English law recognizes an ease-
ment in air and light over adjoining premises, under some
ciroumstances; but the courts of the United States regard
the doctrine which supports it as unsuited to the circum-
stances of this country, and incapable of being applied in
our growing cities and villages without working most mis-
chievous consequences. The injury which one sustains by
having the light: and air as they pass to his buildings ob-
structed and -cut off by the structures of his neighbor, will
therefore support no action.4
3 Butt v. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. App. i58.
Aldred v. Case, 9 Coke, 58 b; Attorney-General v. Dougherty, 2 Ves-
Sr. 453. See Maynard v. Escher, 17 Penn. St. 222.
4 Parker v. Foote, i9 Wend. 309, 318, tier Bronson, J.; Mahan v.
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Collateral Support of Lands.-A man may injure his neigh-
bor's premises by excavations made on his own. Such ex-
cavations are rightful up to a certain limit; beyond that they
are unauthorized. The common law gave every man a right
to collateral support for his own ground in its natural condi-
tion by the land of his neighbor; and to that extent the ad-
joining lands are subject to a servitude. But he has no right
to support for the land weighted with buildings; and if
an excavation is made, with due care and due notice, into
which his buildings fall though without the buildings the
natural surface would not have given way, he has no claim to
compensation. The injury is incidental to the exercise by
his neighbor of a legal right; and a party liable to such an
injury must protect himself as best he may. The rule is thus
stated in an old case: "If A be seized in fee of copyhold
* land closely adjoining the land of B, and A erect a new house
on his copyhold land, and any part of his house is erected on
the confines of his land adjoining the land of B, if B after-
wards dig his land so near to the foundation of the house of
A that by it the foundation of the messuage and the mes-
suage itself fall into the pit, still no action lies by A against
B-inasmuch as it Was the fault of A himself that he built
his house so near the land of B ; for he cannot by .his own
act prevent B from making the best use of his land that he
can. But it seems that a man who has land closely adjoining
my land cannot dig his land so near mine that mine would
fall into his pit; and an action brought for such an act would
lie."5
Injwries by Animals.-A man may rightfully keep domestic
animals, and use and employ them as is customary. Others
may be injured by them, but they are not entitled to redress
unless the owner or keeper is personally guilty of negligence
Brown, 13 Wend. 261 ; Myers v. Gemmel, ioBarb. 537; Cherry v. Stein,
ii Md. I; Hicott v. Morris, io Ohio St. 523; Mullen v. Stricker, 19
Ohio St. 135; Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295; Pierce v. Fernald, 26
Me. 436; Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500.
s Wild v. Minstaley, 2 Rol. Abr. 565. The cases on this subject are
fully collected in Bigelow's Leading Cases on Torts, 527, et seq., and in
Washburn on Easements, 542-564.
HeinOnline  -- 2 S. L. Rev. n.s. 381 1876-1877
INCIDENTAL INJURIES.
or bad conduct. 'If he keeps an animal he knows to be
vicious, without proper restraint, he is liable for the conse-
quences; if he drives a horse furiously, he may be held re-
sponsible to one who is run over by him; but he is not liable
if he was in the observance of due care, and the injury was
accidental. "If one does an injury by unavoidable accident,
an action does not lie; aliter if any blame attaches to him,
though he be innocent of any intention to injure." 6
fZunries from Fires.-No man can lawfully insist, because
of the possibility of a fire spreading to his estate, that his
neighbor shall not burn over his fallow or destroy his stubble
by fire. A fire for any such purpose, or even for amusement,
is perfectly lawful, and if the party setting it is guilty of no
negligence, its accidentally spreading to his neighbor cannot
charge him with an action.7 The old rule was probably more
strict, but even that did not hold the party liable where the
fire spread from sudden.storm, or other cause which could
not have been foreseen or controlled by human agency.8  I
Iqfitries Inficted in Self Defence.-A man assaulted, has a
right to defend himself, and with force and violence propor-
tioned to the real or apparent danger. If, in making such
defence, an injury is unintentionally and without negligence
done to a third person, this is no tort, for no man does wr6ng
or contracts guilt in defending himself against an aggressor.9
The same rule applies to a proper defence of property; an
illustration being the case of building a wall to prevent the
inroads of the sea, whereby a greater force of water is ex-
pended on the lands adjoining.o As was said by Lord Ten-
6Wakeman v. Robinson, r Bing. 213. See Weaver v. Ward, Hobart,
134, Mammac v. White, 1i C. B. (N. S.) 588.
7Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. 421 ; Tourtelotte v. Rosebrook, iI Met. 46o;
Scott v. Hale, 16 Me. 326; Ellis v. Railroad Co., 2 Ired. 138 ; De France
v. Spencer, 2 Greene, (Iowa) 462; Fahn v. Reichart, 8 Wis. 255; Mich.
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 20 Mich. 244; Burroughs v. Housatonic
R. R. Co., 15 Conn. 124.
8Tuberveille v. Stamp, I Salk. 13; Ld.,Raym. 264; Webb v. Railroad
Co., 49 N. Y. 420.
9 Scott v. Shepperd, 3 Wils. 403; 2 Win. BI. 892; Brown v. Kendall,
6 Cush. 292; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75 ; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132.
-In England proprietors of grounds have in some cases been held
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terden, in such a case, the only safe rule to lay down is this:
-that each land-owner for himself may erect such defences for
his lands as the necessity of the case requires, leaving it to
others in like manner to protect themselves against the com-
.mon enemy.""
Protecting against the sea, however, and protecting against
a flowing stream, or against the ordinary floods of streams,
are very different in their nature, and may give rise to differ-
ent liabilities. Proprietors upon the banks of natural streams
are entitled to have them flow on in their natural course; and
whatever embankment or structure tends to prevent this, or
to increase the flow or force at times or in particular places,
to the prejudice of a proprietor, is as much a wrong to him
-as would be the diversion of the water into a new channel."2
liable to tresoassers who were injured by spring guns concealed on the
premises, and of which the trespasser had no notice or knowledge. The
-case is an exception to the general rule, and appears to be put upon the
ground that where one makes use of these dangerous instruments, hu-
manity requires that the fullest possible notice should be given, and the
'law of England will not sanction what is inconsistent with humanity;
in other words, that without such notice, the setting of spring-guns is an
-unauthorized act. Ilott v. Wilks, 3 B. & Aid. 304, fier Best, J. See
'Dean v. Clayton, 7 Taunton, 489; Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, and
Jay v. Whitfield referred to therein. The keeping of ferocious dogs, or
the setting secretly of dangerous traps, is governed by the same rule.
Brock v. Copeland, i Esp. 203 ; Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East, 277 ; Sarch
v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 297. It is a little uncertain how far this princi-
ple can be carried, but doubtless it would be applied in some other cases
-where that is done by one on his own grounds without sufficient reason,
.which might result in loss of life or serious injury to those inadvertently,
or even intentionally, committing trespass thereon. It has been often
held that if one fall into an excavation upon the land of another where
he is not expressly or by invitation invited, he has no claim to compen-
sation from the owner. Blithe v. Topham, Cro. Jac. I58; Stone v.
Jackson, 16 C. B. i99 ; Howland v. Vincent, lo Metc. 373; Hargreaves
v. Deacon, 25 Mich. I. But if one dig a pit-fall with the purpose to
injure trespassers, "humanity" may require that he be held responsible;
and perhaps he should be held responsible in any case of an unguarded
,excavation so near the public way, that one lawfully using the way
.might, without gross negligence, fall into it.
-The King v. Commoners, etc., of Pagham, 8 B. & C. 354.
12 See Gerrish v. Clough, 48 N. H. 9. Compare The King v. Trafford,
a B, & Aid. 873; Williams v. Gale, 3 H. & J. 231.
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Among the most troublesome cases are those which relate
to the right of parties in waters which flow or pass from the
land of one proprietor to those of another, either above or
below the surface, and to their rights respectively to be pro-
tected against such flow or passage when it would be inju-
rious, or to insist upon it when it would be beneficial. A
few of these cases will be mentioned:
.. Dr-awing off sabtefran 'ean waters to the prejudice of anothier.
Lord Ellenborough expressed the opinion in one case that a
party who had for twenty years enjoyed the use of a spring
on his own premises was entitled to be protected in it against
the action of an adjoining proprietor, whose cutting for the
purposes of a drain on his own premises drew away the water
from it.'3 But it is now the settled law of England that ex-
cavations by a proprietor on his own grounds, for his own
purposes, will not render him liable for the accidental injuries
which his neighbor may suffer in consequence of the drawing
off of the water which percolates through the soil. In the
leading case the complaint was that the defendant, by sink-
ing pits, shafts, etc., for mining purposes, had drawn off the
water of certain underground springs, streams and water-
courses on the land of the plaintiff, which he had theretofore
used for manufacturing and other purposes. Tindall, C. J.,
in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Cham-
ber in favor of the defendant, declared that the case "is not
to be governed by the law which applies to rivers and flow-
ing streams, but that it rather falls within that principle which
gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath the surface;
that the land immediately below is his property, whether it
is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil
part water; that the person who owns the surface may dig
therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes, at
his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such
right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from
underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconven-
ience to his neighbor falls within the description of damninn
absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of action." 14-
X3 Balston v. Bensted, i Camp. 463.
24Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 353.
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In this case the question of prescriptive rights was ex-
pressly waived in the opinion of the court, but in a subse-
quent case in the House of Lords it became necessary to
meet it, and it was met with a distinct denial that any such
rights could be claimed in sub-surface waters as they natur-
ally percolated or found their way in secret passages through
the soil. The facts in the case are" stated by Mr. Justice
Wightman, delivering the unanimous opinion of the judges,
and they show that the complaint was that the defendants,
by sinking a well for the supply of a town with water, had
abstracted and intercepted underground water that otherwise
would have flowed and found its way into a stream on which
the plaintiff's mill was situate, and that the quantity so
diverted was sufficient to be of sensible value towards the
working of the plaintiff's mill. The reasoning on the ques-
tion of prescriptive right we pass by, but on the main ques-
tion the previous case in the Exchequer Chamber was fully
approved, and some difficulties in the way of supporting an
action were so forcibly put as to seem unanswerable. A
French Artesian well was referred to, "which was said to
draw part of its supplies from a distance of forty miles, but
underground, and, as far as is known, from percolating water.
In the present case the water which finds its way into the
defendant's well is drained from, and percolates through, an
extensive district, but it is impossible to say how much from
any part. If the rain which has fallen may not be inter-
cepted whilst it is merely percolating through the soil, no
man could safely collect the rain water as it fell into a pond;
nor would he have a right to intercept its fall before it
reached the ground by extensive roofing, from which it might
be conveyed to tanks, to the sensible diminution of water
which had, before the erection of such impediments, reached
the ground and flowed to the plaintiff's mill. In the pres-
ent case the defendant's well is only a quarter of a mile from
the river Wandle; but the question would have been the
same if the distance had been ten or twenty or more miles
distant, provided the effect had been to prevent underground
percolating water from finding its way into the river and in-
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-creasing its quantity to the detriment of the plaintiff's mill."
Such a right, as was well said, was too indefinite and un-
limited to be recognized, and it was rejected by the unani-
mous concurrence of the judges and the law lords.,* The
decision is understood to have settled the law for England,
and it has found general acceptance and concurrence in this
country. 6
In Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., it -was remarked
by the learned Chief Baron that "if the course of a sub-
terranean stream were well known, as is the case with many
which sink underground, pursue for a short space a subter-
raneous course, and then emerge again, it never could be
,contended that the owner of the soil under which the stream
flowed could not maintain an action for the diversion
of it, if it took place under such circumstances as would
have enabled him to recover had the stream been wholly
above ground."'7 Confining this remark to the case of an
x5 Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349. The case in the court
below is reported in 2 H. & N. I68. On the same point reference may
be made to New River Co. v. Johnson, 2 El. & El. 435 ; Hammond v.
Hall, io Sim. 551 ; Smith v. Kendrick, 7 C. B. 566; The Queen v. Met-
ropolitan Board of Works, 3 B. & Smith, 710; Popplewell v. Hodgkin-
son, L. R. 4 Exch. 248.
Io Greenleafv. Francis, iS Pick. 12I; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn.
.St. 528; Frazier v. Brown, r2 Ohio St. 294; Roath v. Driscoll, 20
Conn. 533; Bliss v. Greeley, 45 N. Y. 671; N. A. & S. R. R. Co. v.
Peterson, 14 Ind. 1I2; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Clark v. Conroe,
38 Vt. 469; Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175. In two New Hampshire
cases the doctrine of Acton v. Blundell is questioned; but it would
hardly seem to have been necessary to a decision of the actual contro-
versies that the point should have been passed upon in either case.
Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. Co. 42 N. H. 569; Swett v. Cutts, 5o N. H.
439. In Parker v. B. & M. R. R. 3 Cush., 107, it was decided that if in
consequence of an excavation made for a railroad track the water of a
well on ani estate adjoining is drawn off and the well thereby rendered
dry and useless, the owner of such estate will be entitled to recover
.damages therefor, in the same manner as for land taken for the railroad,
"because the respondents did not own the land; they only acquired a
special right to and usufruct in it, upon condition of paying all damages
,which might thereby be occasioned to others." But see Commonwealth
-v. Richter, i Penn. St. 467 ; N. A. & S. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, i4 Ind. I12.
'7 7 Exch. 282, 300, per Pollock, C. B. In Dudden v. Guardians, etc.
HeinOnline  -- 2 S. L. Rev. n.s. 386 1876-1877
INCIDENTAL INJURIES.
underground stream flowing in a well defined and under-
stood channel, there has been a general disposition to ac-
cept it as sound law.' 8 But one claiming rights in such a
stream will be under the necessity of showing its existence.
It will not be presumed that a spring comes from such a
stream, but rather that it was formed by the ordinary per-
colations of water in the soil.'9 But when a clearly defined
and well known stream is found to exist, rights correspond-
ing to those in streams above ground may be recognized and
protected.20
2. Protection aoainst Falling FT aters and Snows.-A man'
has a clear legal right to protect his premises against falling
waters and snows, though prejudice to others may result.
In the case of urban property he may, in erecting buildings
and making improvements, do this to the extent of com-
pletely preventing the fall of rains and snows upon his
grounds, and the only restriction upon the right appears to
be this: that adjoining proprietors owe such duties to each
other as the requirements of good neighborhood naturally
impose; that each miust so use his own as not unreasonably
to.injure his neighbor, but that this only obliges him to use
all due care and prudence to protect his neighbor, and does
not require that he shall at all events and under all circum-
stances protect him; and any injury that may result not-
withstanding the observance of proper caution, must be
deemed incident to the ownership of town property, and can
give no right of action. If one constructs his building so as
to cast the water therefrom upon the land of another, he is.
i H. & N. 627, the same learned judge said: "It is absurd io say that a
man may take the water of such a stream, even though it be four feet
from the surface."
' See particularly, Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 373;
Smith v. Adams, 6 Paige, 435 ; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528;
Whetstone v. Brower, 29 Penn. St. 59.
19 Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303. See Mosier v. Caldwell, 9 Nev.
363. In Angell on Watercourses, 157, the result of the authorities is.
stated to be that "in order to bring subterranean streams, within
the rules which govern surface streams, their existence and their course-
must be to some extent known and notorious."
-o Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Virginia etc. Water Co., I Sawyer, 470.
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liable therefor, not only to the occupant, but to the rever-
sioner;" but if he puts proper eave-troughs or gutters upon
his building for leading off the water upon his own grounds,
and keeps them in proper order, and is guilty of no -negli-
gence in this regard, an adjoining proprietor can have no
legal complaint against him for injuries resulting from extra-
ordinary or accidental circumstances for which no one is in
fault, but such injuries must be left to be borne by those on
whom they fall.2
3. Drawing off Suiface TVatcr-The drawing off of surface
water may affect adjoining estates either as it deprives them
of the benefit of the ordinary flow in natural watercourse, or
as it increases the ordinary flow in such watercourses, or as
it casts water through ditches upon adjoining lands, or so
near to them that the water percolating through the soil
.causes the adjoining lands to be wet and unsuited to cultiva-
tion, or unproductive. In the first case, that is, where a
lower proprietor is deprived of the benefit of the natural flow
of the water, or of some portion thereof, it is settled that he
-can have no remedy. As has been forcibly said, one party
cannot insist upon another maintaining his field as a mere
water-table for the other's benefit.23 On the other hand, it
-is equally well settled that one may lawfully drain his lands
.into a natural watercourse, even though a lower proprietor is
injured by the increased flow.24 "For the sake of agriculture
-agri colendi causa-a man may drain his ground which is
too moist, and, discharging the water according to its natural
.channel, may cover up and conceal the drains through his
ral channel of his streams, though the flow of water upon his
21 Bater 's Case, 9 Coke, 53 b; Jackson v. Pesked, i M. & S. 234; Tucker
v. Newman, i i A. & El. 4o; Fay v. Prentice, i M. G. & S. 828.
-Underwood v. Valdron, 33 Mich. Compare Bellows v. Sackett, 15
.Barb. 99; Hoare v. Dickinson, Ld. Raym. i568.
'3Rawston v. Taylor, Ii Exch. 369, per Platt. B. See Broadben v.
Ramsbotham, Ii Exch. 602; Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 16o,
167; Waffle v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 58 Barb. 413; Thayer v. Brooks,
17 Ohio, 491 ; Colt v. Lewiston, 36 N. Y. 217.
2 .Williams v. Gale, 3 H. & Johnson, 231; Miller v. Lauback, 47 Penn.
-St. 154; Waffle v. Porter, 61 Barb. 130. See Kauffman v. Griesemer,
:26 Penn. St. 407.
.388
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neighbor be thereby increased. * * It is not more agree-
able to the laws of nature that water should descend than it
is that lands should be farmed and mined; but in many cases
he thereby diminishes, not unreasonably, the supply of his
neighbor below; and may clear out impediments in the natu-
lands; may use running streams to irrigate his fields, though
they cannot be, if an increased volume of water may not be
discharged through natural channels and outlets. The prin-
ciple, therefore, should be maintained, but it should be pru-
dently applied,"25 and it will not preclude the lower lroprie-
tor erecting any such protections as may be needful to guard
his lands against the additional flow, provided they do not
intercept the passage of water which would naturally pass on
to his land.26 In Massachusetts it has been decided that one
may erect barriers to prevent surface water which has accu-
mulated elsewhere from coming upon his land, even though
it is thereby made to flow upon the land of another to his
loss. "The right of an owner of laird to occupy and im-
prove it in such manner and for such purposes, as he may see
fit, either by changing the surface or the erection of buildings
or other structures thereon, is not restricted or modified by
the fact that his own land is so situated with reference to
that of adjoining owners that an alteration in the mode of its
improvement or occupation, in any portion of it, will cause
water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and snows
falling on its surface, or flowing on to it over the surface of
adjacent lands, to pass into and over the same in greater
quantities or in other directions than they were accustomed
to flow.27 The point of these decisions is, that where there
is no watercourse by grant or prescription, and no stipulation
exists between conterminous proprietors of land concerning
the mode in which their respective parcels shall be occupied
and improved, no right to regulate or control the surface
drainage of water can be asserted by the owner of one lot
-5Woodward, J., in Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Penn. St. 407, 414.
-6 Ibid. See Butler v. Peck, i6 Ohio St., 334.
- Citing Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. 171 ; Flagg v.Worcester,
.13.Gray, 6oi; Dickinson v. Vorcester, 7 Allen, 19.
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over that of his neighbor. Cuiu's est solum, ejus est usque ad-
cwilum is a general rule applicable to the use and enjoyment
of real property, and the right of a party to the free and un-
fettered control of his own land, above, upon and beneath
the surface, cannot be interfered with or restrained by any
considerations of injury to others which may be occasioned
by the flow of mere surface water in consequence of the law-
ful appropriation of land by its owner to a particular use or
mode of enjoyment. Nor is it at all material, in the application
of this principle of law, whether a party obstructs or changes:
the direction and flow of surface water by preventing it from
coming within the limits of his land, or by erecting barriers
or changing the level of the soil, so as to turn it off in a new
course after it has come within his boundaries. The obstruc-
tion of surface water, or an alteration in the flow of it, affords
no ca!use of action in behalf of a person who may suffer loss
or detriment therefrom against one who does no act incon--
sistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own
soil." 28
The question of liability where one improves his land by
artificial drains, which cast the water upon a lower proprie-
tor, is difficult. No doubt he may improve them by filling
up low and wet places without incurring liability to a lower-
proprietor upon whom the flow would be increased,29 just as.
the public may lawfully improve the streets and public.
grounds, though the improvement may have the effect to,
cast the falling or surface water upon adjoining grounds.30 A
natural watercourse of course must not be stopped up, and
the water turned back upon the lands of another proprietor.3'
-8 Gannon v. Hargadon, io Allen, io6, fier Bigelow, Ch. J.
-9 Goodale v. Tuttle, 27 N. Y. 459; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 6ol;
Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656.
31 Martin v. Riddle, 26 Penn. St. 415 ; Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9,
Cush. 171.
33 Parks v, Newburyport, io Gray, 28 ;, Flagg v. Worcester, 13 Gray,
6ol; Dickenson v. Worcester, 7 Allen, T9; Turner v. Dartmouth, 13
Allen, 29i; Emery v. Lowell, lO4 Mass. 16; Imler v. Springfield, 55
Mo. i19. If the proprietor of the adjoining lands protects*them by an-
embankment which throws the water back into the road, the public haver
no cause for complaint. Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen,;II.
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But "the true watercourse is well defined. There must be a
stream usually flowing in a particular direction, though it
need not flow continually. It may sometimes be dry. It
must flow in a definite channel, having a bed, sides or banks,
and usually discharge itself into some other stream or body
of water. It must be something more than a mere surface
drainage over the entire face of a tract of land, occasioned
by unusual freshets or other extraordinary causes. It does
not include the water flowing in the hollows or ravines in
land which is the mere surface water from rain or melting
snow, and is discharged through them from a higher to a
lower level, but which at other times are destitute of water.
Such hollows or ravines are not in legal contemplation water-
courses."32
In Iowa, in a carefully considered case, it was held that if
a ditch made by the defendant for the purpose of draining
his lands, and which terminated within sixty feet of the line
of the plaintiff, had the effect to increase the quantity of
water on the plaintiff's land to his injury, or, without increas-
ing it, threw the water upon the land in a different manner
from what the same would naturally have flowed upon it, to
his injury, the defendant would be liable for the injury, even
though the ditch was constructed by the defendant in the
course of the ordinary use and improvement of his farm33
So in Wisconsin it has been decided that the owner of land
on which there is a pond or reservoir of surface water cannot
lawfully discharge it through an artificial channel upon the
land of another, or so near it that it will flow over upon such
land to its injury.34 A case in Ohio somewhat similar was
- Dixon, Ch. J., in Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656, 66r. In the same
case an intimation in Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. 351, that there may pos-
sibly be an exception to this proposition in the case of gorges and narrow
passages in hills or mountainous regions is repeated. As bearing on the
question, see Eulrich v. Richter, 37 Wis. 226.
33 Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, I6o. See Reynolds v. Clark,
Ld. Raym. 1399; Lane v. Jasper, 39 Ill. 54. The case of Adams v.
Walker, 34 Conn. 466, the facts of which are somewhat imperfectly stated
in the report, supports the same principle, and perhaps goes somewhat
further.
34 Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223. 25
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decided in the same way. In that case a part of the water
which the defendant discharged upon the land of the plain-
tiff would naturally have found its way there had the drain
not been cut.35 These cases seem to confine the obligation
of the owner of the lower estate to receive the waters flowing
from the upper estate, to "waters which flow naturally with-
out the art of man; those which come from springs, or from
rain falling directly on the heritage, or even by the natural
dispositions of the place."3
6
4 Collecting Water in Reservoirs.-A man may lawfully
collect water in reservoirs on his premises. What the corre-
sponding rights of his neighbors are is not very satisfactorily
determined. Beyond question they have a right to be pro-
tected against any injurious consequences that might result
from a negligent construction of the reservoirs, or from any
want of care on the part of the person constructing or main-
taining them, in consequence of which the water might escape
to their injury, by percolation or otherwise.37 Whether par-
ties maintaining such reservoirs are not bound to a still stricter
responsibility, is a question we do not care to enter upon in
this place.31  Neither do we deem it of importance to refer
to more familiar questions relating to water rights. Our pur-
pose has been only to present some classes of cases which
may supply proper illustrations of the general principle
which is stated at the beginning of the present paper.
.Malice as an Ingredient in Torts.-As injury alone does not
give a right of action, neither, as a general rule, do injury and
malice combined. There must be a combination of wrong
35 Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St., 334.
3, Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Penn. St. 407, 413. See Martin v. Jett,
12 La. 5oi. As to the right of the upper proprietor to have natural pas-
sage for the surface water kept open for his drainage, though they are
not watercourses, see Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen, 211; Goodale v. Tuttle,
29 N. Y. 459; Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St., 247; Martin, ex 'harte, 13
Ark. x98.
37 Monson Manf. Co. v. Fuller, 15 Pick. 334; Fuller v. Chiccopee
Manf. Co., 6 Gray, 46; Wilson v. New Bedford, io8 Mass. 261; Prixley
v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520.
33 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. I Exch. 265; s. c. in error, 3 H. L.
Cas. 330.
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and injury to constitute a tort, and malice is not of itself a
legal wrong. If one is only exercising his lawful rights,
others can have no concern with his motives. A man may
establish a business with the malicious purpose to destroy
the business of his neighbor. This is no tort, whether he
accomplishes his purpose or not, for he had a clear legal
right to establish a new business, and his motives in doing so
are not to be enquired into.39
"An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot
be actionable because it is done with a bad intent."4o This,
remark was made in a case where a landlord was charged
with having maliciously distrained for more rent than was
due to him, but it was only the statement of a principle that
is as old as the common law. It has been applied in a case
in which a prosecution was alleged to have been instituted
maliciously, but where there was not an absence of probable
cause, 41 and to cases of alleged malicious arrest of persons,
privileged from arrest by being in attendance on court on
subpcena, or by other causes, 42 and of maliciously issuing
execution on a judgment which had been entered up for too
large an amount, but which had not been corrected at the
time suit was brought.43
In Mahan v. Brown the plaintiff declared against the de-
fendant for wantonly and maliciously erecting on his own
premises a high fence near to and in front of the plaintiff's
39 Auburn & Cato Plank R. Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 450.
40 Parke, B., in Stevenson v. Newnham, 13 C. B- 285, 297. See Floyd
v. Barbee, 12 Coke, 23; Stowball v. Ansell, Comb. ii; Tayler v.
Hunniker, 12 Ad. & El. 488; Heald v. Carey, ii C. B. 993; Clinton v.
Myers, 46 N. Y. 5 11; Covanhoven ir.Hart, 21 Penn. St., 5o [; Jenkins v.
Fowler, 24 Penn. St. 308; Fowlerv. Jenkins, 28 Penn. St. 176; Glendon
Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Penn. St. 467 ; Smith v.Johnson, 76 Penn. St. I9I.
41 Anonymous, 6 Mod. 73; Williams v. Tayler, 6 Bingham, 183;
Forshay v. Furguson, 2 Denio, 617, 620; Ammerman v. Crosby, 26
Ind. 451 ; Barton v. Kavanaugh, 12 La. An. 332.
42Vandevelde v. Lluellin, i Keb. 22o; Maguay v. Burt, 5 Q. B. 381.
43 Huffer v. Allen, L. R. 2 Exch. 15. See Gerard v. Lewis, 2 C. P.
305, in which Willes, J., says that the words "wrongfully and unlawfully
are mere words of vituperation, ahd amount to nothing unless they show
a cause of action."
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windows, without benefit or advantage to himself, and for the
sole purpose of annoying the plaintiff, thereby obstructing
the air and light from entering her windows, and rendering
her house uninhabitable. The court held that the action
would not lie. "The defendant has not so used his property
as to injure another. No one, legally speaking, is injured or
damnified, unless some right is infringed. The refusai or
discontinuance of a favor gives no cause of action. The
plaintiff in this case has only been refused the use of that
Q which did not belong to her; and whether the motiires of
the defendant were good or bad, she has no legal cause of
complaint."44
In the South Royalton Bank v. The Suffolk Bank the
same principle was involved. The defendants were charged
with having maliciously and with intent to injure the plain-
tiff gathered up its circulating bills, and taken them out of
circulation, and afterwards presented them in quantities for
redemption to the injury of the plain tiff. On demurrer the
cou t say: "Motive alone is not enough to render the de-
fendants liable for doing those acts which they had a right
to do. It is too well settled to need authority that malice
alone will not sustain an action for a vexatious suit. There
must also be want of probable cause. This principle is
enough to settle this case. If the defendants could not be
sued for instituting suits maliciously to collect pay upon the
plaintiff's bills, which they lawfully held, much less could
they be sued for simply calling upon the defendants for pay,
without the intervention of a suit, though done with malice.
It may be true that sometimes the consequences attending
an act may serve to give character to that act, and the rule
has become established and grown into a maxim, that a man
must use his own rights with due regard to the rights of
others; but this principle does not apply to the present case.
Here the act of presenting the plaintiff's bill for payment
has no natural cormection with any injurious consequences
to follow from it, and if such consequences follow, they
44 Mahan v. Brown, r3 Wend. 261, 365, her Savage, Ch. J. See Pan-
ton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92.
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must be fortuitous, and cannot give character to the act so
as to render it unlavful."4s
The same principle was applied in the case of Hunt v.
Simonds, in which the plaintiff declared against insurance
officers for maliciously conspiring to refuse insurance on his
property to his injury. As he had no legal right to demand
to be insured by them, it was clear that they had a lawful
right to refuse; and whether they did this from good
motives or from bad motives was of no legal importance.46
The case of public officers who have discretionary or
judicial duties to perform is familiar. "The law will not
allow malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit
against such an officer for what he does in the performance
of a judicial duty."47 "If a jury will find a special verdict;
if a judge will take time to consider; if a bishop will delay
a patron and impannel a jury to enquire of the right of pat-
ronage ; you cannot bring an action for these delays, though
you suppose it to be done maliciously and on purpose to put
you to charges; though you suppose it be done scienter
knowing the law to be clear; for they take but the liberty
the law has provided, and there can be no demonstration
that they have not real doubts, for these are within their own
breasts; and it would be very mischievous that a man might
not have leave to doubt without so great a peril."4 As was
remarked in a case in which a surveyor of highways was
charged with maliciously working the highway in a manner
detrimental to the plaintiff: "The true enquiry was,
45 Bennett, J. in South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505, 508.
46 Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583.
47 Beardsley, J., in Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 120. See Floyd v.
Bender, 12 Coke, 23; Evans v. Foster, I N. H. 377; Yates v. Lansing, 5
Johns. 282; s. c. in Error, 9 Johns. 394; Laning v. Bentham, 2 Bay, I ;
Brodie v. Rutledge, Ibid. 69 ; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 68 ; Garnett v.
Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 61r; Dicas v. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P. 249; Fray
v. Blackburn, 3 B.,& S. 576; Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 5 Q. B. ioS; s.
c. in Error, 4 Fost. & Fin. 8o6.
48 North, Ch. J., in Barnardiston v. Soame, 6 How. State Trials, io99.
See Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Exch. 22o. The subject was largely
considered in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335.
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whether the defendant had legal authority to do what he did
in the highway. If he had such authority, and acted within
the scope of it, he is not a trespasser because his motives or
purposes with respect to the plaintiff were unkind or mali-
cious."49
Within this principle, also falls the case of one in author-
ity, who, under a discretionary power pertaining to his
office, puts a subordinate on trial for alleged violation of the
laws. The exercise of such a discretion cannot be a tort,
even though bad motive or want of probable cause be
charged.5o Neither can the malice of a witness in giving
injurious testimony, nor the malice of a party in making in-
jurious allegations in affidavits which he files in the course
of judicial proceedings render him liable to an action at the
suit of the party aggrieved.5' These cases are referred to
as illustrations merely; there are many others in which the
same principle is applied.
It has been made a question whether the principle is appli-
cable in cases where one is dealing with surface water, or
water percolating through the soil of his premises, to the in-
jury of his neighbor. In Chatfield v. Wilson it was applied
without hesitation. The case was one of gathering water on
the defendant's premises which otherwise would have per-
colated through the soil of the plaintiff, supplying a reservoir
and aqueduct which had been constructed by him, and
malice was charged. "There are," it is said by the court,
"many cases in the books relating to ithe relative use of sur-
face streams, where the case has turned upon the question
whether the use was reasonable, and for the party's own con-
venience or benefit, or wanton and malicious, and done to
prejudice the rights of another. In such cases there are cor-
49Thomas, J. in Benjamin v. Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409 ; see Sage v. Lau-
rain, 19 Mich. 137 ; Thornton v. Thornton, 64 N. C. 211.
so Johnston v. Sutton, i T. R. 549 ; Freer v. Marshall, 4 Fost. & Fin.
485; Dawkins v. Lord Pawlett, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94 ; Dawkins v. Lord
Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 285, and 4 Fost. & Fin. 8o6.
5' Damport v. Simpson, Cro Eliz. 520; Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 125 ;'
Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569; Cunningham v. Brown, 18
Vt. 123; Dunlap v. Glidden, 31 Me. 435 ; White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. I66:
1396
HeinOnline  -- 2 S. L. Rev. n.s. 396 1876-1877
INCIDENTAL INIURIES.
relative rights to the use of the water, and the boundary of
the right is a reasonable use of it. But such cases have no
analogy to the case at bar, and it may be laid down as a
position not to be controverted, that an act legal in itself,
violating no right, cannot be made actionable on the ground
of the motive which induced it. Such was the case of South
Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505. If the act is
lawful, although it may be prejudicial, it is damnziin absque
iizfitria. On this point the case of Mahan v. Brown, 13
Wend. 261, is a direct authority."'52 This view appears also
to have been accepted in Ohio, "subject only to the possible
exception of a case of unmixed malice."53 The intimations
the other way have, however, been very strong. Lord Cran-
worth, in Chasemore v. Richards, expressed very great doubt
whether a party would be at liberty to abstract water on his
own premises for the use, unconnected with his own estate,
of those who would have had no right to take it directly
themselves, to the injury of neighboring l5roprietors who
would have had an equal right with him.54 In Massachusetts
the instructions of the trial court, that if the defendant dug
the well which drew water away from the plaintiff, for the
purpose of injuring the plaintiff, and not for the purpose of
obtaining water for his own use, he was liable for so doing,
were very distinctly approved by the court in banc.55 And
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania appears to have recog-
nized the same doctrine in several cases.
56
There seems to be some difficulty in .aying down a rule
for these cases that will be quite satisfactory in principle and
in its workings. That a man may lawfully make an excava-
tion on his premises for the sole purpose of drawing away
the water from his neighbor's well and rendering it useless,
--Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 57.
-3 Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St., 294, 304.
s4 Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 388.
5SGreenleafv. Francis, i Pick. 117, 122.
6 Wheatley v. Baugh. 25 Penn. St. 528; Whetstone v. Bowser, 29
Penn. St. 59; Haldeman v. Bruckhardt, 45 Penn. St. 514. See, also,
Trustees of Delphi etc. v. Youmans, 5o Barb. 5 16; Waffle v. Porter, 6i
Barb. 130.
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seems to be, and is in fact, a monstrous doctrine. On the
other hand it cannot be held consistent with the authorities,
or perhaps with reason, that adjoining proprietors have rights
in the water percolating through the soil, corresponding to
those they may have in p running stream which crosses their
several estates. Such a rule would raise questions of reason-
able use, and create difficulties both of evidence and of ap-
plication .that would make the right to such waters more
troublesone than valuable. The courts have doubtless been
right in declaring that one proprietor cannot insist on another
keeping his estate as a filter for the use of the former, nor be
heard to complain if the use by his neighbor of his own
estate draws off the secret particles of water which otherwise
he might have gathered. These waters belong to no one
until they are collected, and they may be appropriated by
the one who collects and puts them to use.
But though neither proprietor has such a right in or control
over the water as will enable him to complain of his neigh-
bor's appropriation, does not each owe to the other certain
duties of good neighborhood, among which is the duty to
abstain from purposely withdrawing the water that may be
useful to both, when a use of it is not intended? Conceding
that he may collect it for use, does this entitle him to do so
not for use but of malice? If he sinks a well to supply his
house or water his stock, it must be admitted that no ques-
tion can be raised whether this is or is not a reasonable appro-
priation of the water; but if he digs a hole to injure his
neighbor, it is not perceived that the two cases are necessarily
to be governed by the same rule. What is a man's right in
respect to the water percolating through his soil? The just
answer seems to be this: It is a right to gather and appro-
priate it to his lawful uses. When he does this, he is exer-
cising his right, and his motive is not open to enquiry. But
when he collects it, not for use but to injure his neighbor, he
exceeds his right, and there is that conjunction of wrong and
injury which constitute a tort and will support an action.
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
ANN ARBOR, MICH.
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